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Foreword
The Joseph Rowntree Foundation has been interested in balanced communities 
since its earliest days. The village in New Earswick that Joseph Rowntree built at the 
beginning of the 20th century sought to provide a mix of housing, meeting the needs 
of those who were poor, as well as those in much better circumstances.
Our mission to search out the causes of disadvantage, and our particular focus 
on poverty and place has involved us heavily in debates about the ways in which 
patterns of housing tenure affect neighbourhoods and communities. In taking part in 
this debate we have been under no illusions that mixed income communities are a 
universal solution to all the problems of poverty and place. The development of mixed 
income communities alone cannot create stronger, more sustainable and more 
resilient communities. The evidence does, however, demonstrate that there are some 
beneﬁ ts directly attributable to the creation of more balanced neighbourhoods. In our 
research on this topic, the Foundation examined experiences in a number of mixed 
income communities to learn more about these areas, and identify what ingredients 
help make neighbourhoods work. Key ﬁ ndings from our review were that:
n The mixed income communities studied were overwhelmingly judged to be 
successful; they were not characterised by the problems often linked with 
exclusively low-income areas. The schemes had generally met the expectations 
of developers, residents and housing managers and had become pleasant places 
to live and work.
n Mixed tenure and mixed income were ‘non-issues’ to residents – they saw 
their neighbours as ‘ordinary people’. Whilst residents may not have developed 
personal friendships across tenures, they described their relationships as ‘civil’ 
and ‘polite’. However there was no speciﬁ c evidence of role-model effects or 
increased social capital through the introduction of mixed communities.
n Mixed income communities in cities can attract young families on decent incomes 
but families are interested in the availability of good schools, and well designed 
housing of an appropriate size. Where mixed developments lack larger homes in 
their private sector provision this reduces their appeal.
n There was no evidence that mixed communities lowered the prices of houses for 
sale or put off potential purchasers. Design, location and quality were seen as the 
key factors affecting sales and price levels.
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But planning tenure mix is only one part of the picture. Tenure is not ﬁ xed and, as 
it alters in a community, so can the population of residents. The implications of this 
need to be thought through and other dimensions of mix – income, home type and 
size, and household type – also need to be considered.
We are under no illusions about mixed income communities. We know they do not 
address the deep and persistent poverty and inequality that faces many individuals, 
families and neighbourhoods. Nor can they alone improve people’s life chances and 
opportunities. Social change is complex and there is no quick ﬁ x solution. There are 
still gaps in our knowledge. We do not know how the mix in places alters over time 
and there is limited knowledge on the extent to which mixed communities can be 
engineered and sustained. 
Paul Cheshire’s think piece offers a trenchant critique of the current debate about 
mixed communities. He argues that people’s incomes and housing market effects by 
their nature sort people into particular areas and that patterns of social segregation 
in cities largely reﬂ ect the outcome of competition for access to local public goods 
such as better schools or amenities. He suggests that concentrations of poverty 
are mainly the result of inequality of income, which in turn produces the intense 
social segregation that is such a concern to policy makers and practitioners in the 
UK and abroad. He brings an economic geographer’s analysis and perspective, and 
challenges policy makers and practitioners to be clear about the objectives they wish 
to achieve, and to present the evidence for change that is too often taken for granted.
Forthcoming work for the Foundation supports the view that there is increasing 
income inequality and spatial polarisation. If we are interested in social justice, mixed 
communities policies are treating the symptoms of problems of inequality rather than 
tackling the causes, which might be better tackled through income redistribution and 
policies aimed directly at changing those factors which make and keep people poor.
The Joseph Rowntree Foundation is concerned to tackle the root causes of poverty 
and disadvantage. It is also committed to searching for the causes of poverty and 
disadvantage within neighbourhoods, and in doing so wishes to consider all the 
available evidence.
Paul Cheshire’s paper is a valuable contribution to an important debate. For 
individuals and families living in poverty in some of the most disadvantaged 
communities in the UK, it is critically important that the debate is based on the best 
possible thinking, the widest possible evidence, and a willingness to consider all the 
implications of a policy of mixed income communities.
Julia Unwin
Director, Joseph Rowntree Foundation
Executive summary
The belief that it is fairer if communities are mixed, with poorer people living 
alongside richer ones, can be traced at least to the late nineteenth century and 
the founders of the Garden City Movement. The idea was built into Hampstead 
Garden Suburb before the First World War. Although the appetite for new towns in 
the countryside has all but died, the ideal of ‘mixed communities’ as a mechanism 
for achieving a measure of social equality has gained momentum and is now ﬁ rmly 
established in national policy.
This report argues that this is essentially a belief-based policy since there is scant 
clear-cut evidence that making communities more mixed makes the life chances of 
the poor any better. It is treating the symptoms rather than the causes of poverty. 
Efforts to improve social equity would be more effective if they were directed towards 
people themselves rather than moving people around to mix neighbourhoods.
That the poor are spatially concentrated is well documented. Residential segregation 
on the basis of both income and ethnicity is a universal feature of all cities in 
which people have a measure of control over where they live. Patterns of spatial 
segregation are long established and many of the most deprived areas have been 
so for at least a generation. Many of the poorest neighbourhoods in London have 
been amongst the poorest since 1881. Recent research on housing markets has 
established a powerful reason why the poor tend to be conﬁ ned to the most deprived 
neighbourhoods with the worst schools, highest crime rates and lowest levels 
of both public and private amenities. All such characteristics of neighbourhoods 
are effectively capitalised in house prices and rents. It costs more to live in nicer 
neighbourhoods. The poor do not choose to live in areas with higher crime rates and 
worse pollution: they cannot afford not to. That is, the incomes of people determine 
the character of the neighbourhood they can afford to live in. The problem is poverty, 
not where poor people live.
It is perfectly plausible to expect that, in addition, poor people are made poorer by the 
character of the neighbourhood in which they live. Amenities are worse, information 
about jobs and jobs themselves are less accessible, and peer groups may have 
negative feedback effects. None of this is implausible but a close examination of 
the best research available does not reveal any clear evidence to support it. Indeed 
the most scientiﬁ c evidence there is, from the American Moving to Opportunity 
programme, suggests that in signiﬁ cant ways some poor people suffer if they move 
to richer neighbourhoods.
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If your income is low, you may be better off living in cheap housing because there is 
more money available for food, clothing and other expenses. We know that people 
derive beneﬁ ts of various kinds – not directly measured in money terms – from living 
among other people who are similar and complementary to themselves. As this 
report shows, there are deeply entrenched forces, not only producing segregation 
into homogeneous neighbourhoods, but also maintaining existing patterns. The 
spending of richer households generates local amenities that they value and which 
also increase the value of their houses, making it more difﬁ cult for poor people to live 
there.
There is a strong argument in favour of greater social equality but unless there is 
evidence that the characteristics of the neighbourhoods in which people live make 
their life chances worse, independently of what makes them poor in the ﬁ rst place, 
the case for forcing neighbourhood mixing is at best a distraction or, at worst, 
plain wrong. It costs real resources: because of the deeply entrenched social and 
economic forces at work, it is likely to cost signiﬁ cant resources year on year to 
prevent neighbourhoods unmixing; and the evidence that it improves the lives of poor 
people is remarkably elusive.
Moreover, it diverts efforts away from tackling the underlying causes of poverty 
and social exclusion, lulling us into a comforting but false belief that we are doing 
something positive. Mixed neighbourhood policies help divert attention from the need 
for effective policies to tackle poverty which would include income redistribution. It 
seems fair that richer people should pay for policies to tackle poverty effectively. That 
does not mean, however, that we should completely ignore the welfare of the more 
afﬂ uent. The evidence strongly suggests that not only does mixing neighbourhoods 
not effectively help the poor but it also detracts from the welfare of the better off 
because it makes it more difﬁ cult for them to ﬁ nd neighbourhoods populated by other 
complementary households. Spending resources to mix neighbourhoods is not so 
much a redistribution of social welfare as its conﬁ scation.
x
1Introduction
This report is about the dynamics of cities and the patterns of residential segregation 
that arise within them. More speciﬁ cally, it is an attempt to consider the welfare 
and equity implications of the fact of social segregation: segregation on the basis 
of income, ethnicity, age and demographic status, or education. The result of this 
analysis and reassessment of the evidence calls into question current policies 
designed to produce ‘mixed communities’. We behave and apply policies as if it were 
a fact that the separation of different types of people and households into distinct 
and segregated neighbourhoods generates speciﬁ c social costs, additional to those 
generated by inequality itself. But careful examination of the evidence suggests that 
such policies are more a matter of faith than anything else.
Readers are invited to assess this claim on the basis of the evidence presented. The 
issue at stake is not that poor people live in deprived neighbourhoods and that such 
neighbourhoods provide an environment and amenities which make the lives of poor 
people worse. That is well documented. The key issue at stake is the direction of 
causation:
n Do rich households concentrate in rich and expensive neighbourhoods because 
they can afford to buy into the amenities and superior public goods such 
neighbourhoods give access to?
n Do poor households equally concentrate in deprived and unattractive 
neighbourhoods because their incomes do not allow them to buy into better 
neighbourhoods?
n Or does living in a poor neighbourhood cause people’s incomes to be lower, so 
the poor – and particularly their children – tend to become even poorer?
There is ample and persuasive evidence that the former direction of causation is at 
work and is powerful. If that is the only direction of causation for observed patterns 
of segregation then, essentially, social segregation is a manifestation of voluntary 
sorting, conditioned by income. Just as richer households buy more expensive and 
better clothes and better holidays, health care and educational opportunities for their 
children, so they ‘buy’ better neighbourhoods. If this is the direction of causation, the 
equity problem is not with the places in which people live but with the distribution 
of incomes. Unless there is clear evidence of reverse causation, the case for mixed 
communities cannot be evidence based.
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It is, of course, plausible that geographically concentrated poverty is a greater 
social evil than dispersed poverty. There is a strong correlation between living in a 
deprived neighbourhood and being poor; or living in a neighbourhood dominated 
by immigrants or ethnic minorities and being an immigrant or a member of a 
minority ethnic group. So it might seem obvious that living in poor and deprived 
neighbourhoods must impose costs on the inhabitants of those neighbourhoods 
beyond the disadvantages of low incomes, poor health, migrant status or lack of 
labour market skills. The families living in such neighbourhoods experience poor 
services, frequently have a worse environmental quality (atmospheric pollution or 
noise), suffer greater ill health and are much more likely to be the victims of crime. 
The schools which serve such neighbourhoods are on average worse – certainly 
measured by the exam results their pupils achieve or by truancy rates. Children grow 
up with less successful adult role models and with peer groups who lead them into 
bunking off school and petty crime. They do not have the chances in life that children 
raised in advantaged neighbourhoods have. That seems obvious and it is what we 
appear to believe.
The problem with this conclusion is that it ignores a number of difﬁ cult facts. The 
ﬁ rst of these is that in all cities for which there is – or ever has been – evidence, 
neighbourhoods have been segregated. This was very clearly the case in ancient 
Rome in which there were neighbourhoods segregated by artisanal trade as well 
as income. The particular patterns of segregation seem to be remarkably stable 
over time. Many of the London neighbourhoods amongst the poorest in 1881 were 
still amongst the poorest in 2001 (Meen et al., 2007); there is substantial stability 
in the pattern of the local authority areas which were most segregated in 1971 and 
in 2001 (Meen, 2006). Moreover, when policy has deliberately constructed ‘mixed’ 
neighbourhoods, over time they have tended to become segregated again.
Perhaps the English village provided the romantic blueprint for the ‘mixed 
community’. But even there, the ‘rich man was in his castle and the poor man at 
his gate’. Being small communities, however, the rich ‘neighbourhood’ sometimes 
consisted only of the ‘big house’ or the manor. The rural poor often lived in crowded 
hovels – most of which have not survived. The larger an urban area is, the larger the 
areas dominated by particular types of household, rich or poor, tend to be (Gordon 
and Monastiriotis, 2006). As Krupka (2007) points out, using neighbourhoods of 
roughly constant size (such as census tracts or local authority areas), the larger 
the city is, the greater the degree of measured segregation there will appear to 
be, other things being equal. This is because there are enough households in 
particular income groups to ﬁ ll up more completely the chosen spatial deﬁ nition of 
‘neighbourhood’. Useful deﬁ nitions of neighbourhood, therefore, are likely to vary with 
city size and be largest in the largest cities.
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With the ex-urbanisation of British cities, villages – or at least those that have an 
agricultural origin – typically have become segregated, rich, commuter communities. 
Functionally such villages have become component neighbourhoods of large city 
regions; in the sense used in this report, they are ‘specialised neighbourhoods’ 
of large urban areas. Indeed, it can be argued that specialisation is the central 
contribution of cities to progress and welfare.
Underlying the longevity and pervasiveness of residential segregation in 
human settlements is the second difﬁ cult fact ignored by advocates of ‘mixed 
neighbourhoods’. Specialisation underlies the agglomeration economies cities 
generate, both in production and in terms of the additional choices they provide for 
consumption and lifestyles; and segregated neighbourhoods are simply the ﬂ ip side 
of specialised neighbourhoods. A larger number of specialised neighbourhoods 
provides a wider choice of urban community types and social settings in which to live. 
But like all other choices about what to consume, such choices are strictly subject to 
the constraint imposed by one’s income.
This is the third difﬁ cult fact advocates of mixed neighbourhoods ignore: establishing 
the direction of causation. If neighbourhood choice is conditioned by income, poor 
neighbourhoods exist because there are poor people and we live in an unequal 
society; and, as is explained below, we may be collectively and individually better off 
living in neighbourhoods with other similar households, whether we are rich or poor. 
For any given overall distribution of household incomes that could be an argument 
for having specialised neighbourhoods. It certainly is not, however, an argument for 
having inequity or poverty within a rich society.
Specialised neighbourhoods
Throughout this report, this term is used to indicate a residential neighbourhood 
in which households of a particular character tend to be concentrated. Deprived 
neighbourhoods would therefore be an example; but so would neighbourhoods 
predominantly occupied by other groups such as middle-aged, middle-class 
white commuters, young professionals, young families, Sylheti-speaking 
Bangladeshi Muslims, Hindi-speaking Hindus or Polish migrant workers.
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The purpose of this research is to subject the conclusions people have drawn 
from observing concentrations of deprivation, and the policies that have been 
implemented on the basis of those conclusions, to critical examination. The report 
considers the following questions:
n What conditions need to apply for a policy of imposing ‘mixed neighbourhoods’ to 
increase social welfare?
n What explanations are there for the existence of socially segregated 
neighbourhoods?
n How do these explanations relate to what we know about the functions of cities, 
the advantages and costs cities generate, and the sources of welfare?
n Do policies for mixed communities address the cause of actual deprivation and, if 
so, are they cost effective compared to other remedies?
Agglomeration economies
Living in large concentrations – cities – creates costs: higher costs of scarce 
space, congestion, pollution and more crime. But there are counterbalancing 
advantages which economists call agglomeration economies. These are 
beneﬁ ts to both ﬁ rms and households which arise from close proximity and are 
not directly reﬂ ected in prices. So ﬁ nancial ﬁ rms in the City of London become 
more productive both by being located in close proximity to other ﬁ nancial 
ﬁ rms and because they are close to specialised support services. They are 
also more productive because of the extraordinary range and depth of skills 
they can draw on. At the same time households may not just have more and 
better labour market opportunities from living in large cities but also have a 
much richer range of cultural and consumption opportunities. They may also 
gain from locating in specialised neighbourhoods with other complementary 
households. This may enrich social interaction and cultural opportunities, 
provide useful support networks and, it appears, improve labour market access. 
Agglomeration economies most obviously manifest themselves spatially in the 
form of specialised areas of economic activity such as the City of London or 
Soho’s media cluster. They appear also to manifest themselves in specialised 
neighbourhoods although there are other reasons for segregation as well.
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These questions are important because a reduction in the intensity of social 
segregation, by means of active policies to foster ‘mixed communities’, is an explicit 
aim of government policy (ODPM, 2005). Attempting to achieve the aim consumes 
signiﬁ cant resources, particularly in the realm of social housing, planning policies 
and expenditure by developers as a result of Section 106 agreements. A condition 
of planning permission is often that a signiﬁ cant proportion of a development is 
composed of ‘affordable’ housing within the reach of lower-income households. If, 
however, making communities more mixed (or less segregated) does not improve the 
welfare of poorer people and reduces the welfare of richer people – or just makes 
no difference to either group – then it is a waste of real resources which could have 
been used to actually improve the position of poorer groups, if we had had a better 
understanding of how cities worked and of the sources of welfare.
The report is structured as follows:
n First, there is a brief discussion of the origins of the idea that mixed 
neighbourhoods represent a socially desirable way of living.
n Second, it examines whether living in a worse or more deprived neighbourhood 
is a separate evil from poverty itself – if it reduces a person’s (child’s) chances 
in life. This is commonly called the ‘neighbourhood effect’ and is examined in two 
ways:
n by looking at the impact on welfare if people are moved from deprived 
neighbourhoods to more afﬂ uent ones. This draws mainly on evidence from 
the Moving to Opportunity (known as the MTO) experiment in the USA, a 
unique, semi-scientiﬁ c, experiment set up to help some poor households to 
make such a move and to track the results.
n by examining how living in mixed neighbourhoods affects the life chances and 
welfare of the poor. It considers how labour markets work and the role within 
that of neighbourhoods and informal contacts.
n Third, the report reviews the evidence as to why neighbourhoods segregated by 
income persist. It looks at:
n the dynamics of neighbourhood segregation – what happens to people in poor 
neighbourhoods who upgrade their skills
n the way in which housing markets effectively price the poor out of nice 
neighbourhoods.
n Finally, it concludes with a section which examines the implications of these 
ﬁ ndings for policy in the light of the focus on mixed communities and how this 
relates to the arguments about the relationship between poverty and place and 
‘neighbourhood effects’.
61 Why neighbourhoods should be 
mixed
The desire for neighbourhoods to be more ‘mixed’ or ‘balanced’ is not new. It can 
be traced back at least as far as the nineteenth-century designers and visionaries 
who gave rise to the Garden City Movement and, ultimately, to town and country 
planning. One of the ﬁ rst developments reﬂ ecting these new impulses was Bedford 
Park, in Chiswick, in West London, which began with the construction of the District 
Line of the Underground in 1871. It was designed to provide a community within easy 
reach of London and as a home for liberal professionals and artists, with cottages 
as well as substantial middle-class homes, in order to ensure ‘social balance’. The 
construction of cottages was stopped, however, soon after the ﬁ rst residents arrived 
and complained that such houses would ‘attract the wrong sort of tenants’ (Afﬂ eck 
Greeves, 1975, caption to Figure 108). Similarly, Hampstead Garden Suburb, started 
in 1910 by two disciples of Ebenezer Howard, was intended to be a ‘balanced’ 
community but within a short period had become an afﬂ uent professional suburb 
(Weinreb and Hibbert, 1993, p. 367).
More recent work, associated notably with Wilson (1987), identiﬁ ed a problem 
of social exclusion, with signiﬁ cant harmful effects associated with living in 
neighbourhoods in which poverty was concentrated. This was part of the argument of 
ODPM (2005):
People living in deprived neighbourhoods are less likely to work, more 
likely to be poor and have lower life expectancy, more likely to live in 
poorer housing in unattractive local environments with high levels of 
antisocial behaviour and lawlessness and more likely to receive poorer 
education and health services. Living in a deprived area adversely affects 
individuals’ life chances over and above what would be predicted by their 
personal circumstances and characteristics.
(ODPM, 2005, p. 6)
The report documented in great detail differences in outcomes for people living 
in deprived areas (deﬁ ned as the 10 per cent most deprived wards identiﬁ ed 
on the Index of Multiple Deprivation) compared to the average for England as a 
whole. Worklessness rates were some 25 per cent compared to less than 10 per 
cent; a third more of the adult population of such areas had no qualiﬁ cations; and 
life expectancy was two years less. To conclude from this evidence that mixed 
communities were the recipe for reducing inequality and tackling social exclusion was 
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either ingenuous or showed sleight of hand. None of the ﬁ gures supposedly showing 
the problems of living in deprived areas related to individuals with characteristics 
similar to those of people not living in deprived areas. It was all measures of the 
average levels of income, health, education or unemployment of the inhabitants 
of the deprived areas. Crime rates were just that: the rate of crime in deprived 
neighbourhoods.
The problem is that none of this evidence is in dispute. It simply does not address the 
issue of causation.
Not only is the desire for mixed neighbourhoods not new, it is, one might suspect, 
suspiciously old. It was originally formulated as a social aspiration without any 
diagnosis of the root causes of poverty but with a ﬁ rm belief in improving people’s 
lives by improving the built environment. In the context of public health, perhaps 
this was the single biggest step ever made towards making cities healthier and 
more habitable. But, as a solution for poverty, it appears only to have addressed an 
obvious symptom. For a sceptical academic there must be a fear that researchers 
and policy makers have been trying to retroﬁ t the analysis and evidence to support 
the ‘solution’ ﬁ xed on by the pioneers of town planning in the nineteenth century.
82 Poverty and place: determining 
causation
There are two major problems. The ﬁ rst is how to be sure when we compare the 
outcomes for individuals living in different types of areas that we have adjusted for all 
the relevant characteristics. When studies compare indicators of deprivation of those 
living in deprived communities with those living in more afﬂ uent neighbourhoods 
there may be important but difﬁ cult-to-measure characteristics inﬂ uencing people’s 
life chances which are not standardised for because they are not observed. For 
example, there may be a genetic predisposition to suffer from dyslexia which then 
inﬂ uences a whole range of other outcomes; people also vary in their motivation and 
aspirations, even their luck.
The second issue is that above all people select the neighbourhoods – subject of 
course to varying constraints – in which they live. As Goering et al. (2003) point out:
Since people typically select their neighbourhoods to match their needs 
and resources, researchers restricted to cross-sectional, nonexperimental 
evidence must try to separate the impact of personal factors affecting 
choice of neighbourhood from effects of neighbourhood. But it is difﬁ cult 
if not impossible to measure all those socioeconomic, personal and local 
characteristics well enough to distinguish their effects. 
(Goering et al., 2003, p. 4)
Separating the impact of personal factors affecting choice of neighbourhood 
from the effects of neighbourhood requires great ingenuity and work on the 
part of the researcher. The evidence on which ODPM (2005) based their policy 
recommendations did not even begin to make the essential adjustments for difﬁ cult-
to-observe personal characteristics that methodological rigour demands.
Experimental evidence from moving poor people to 
afﬂ uent neighbourhoods
Given how difﬁ cult and costly it is in research terms to compile clear evidence on 
the direction of causation, it is worth reporting on the US Moving to Opportunity 
(MTO) experiment in some detail. It may relate to a different country and context but 
it is the most carefully researched evidence available on the issue; and this is the 
crucial issue on which the case for mixed communities ultimately depends. The MTO 
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programme was set up in 1992 to ‘assist very low income families with children who 
reside in public housing … to move out of areas with high concentrations of persons 
living in poverty to areas with low concentrations of such persons’.1  The MTO project 
was designed both to pilot a policy designed to relieve the perceived problems of 
concentrated neighbourhood poverty and as a scientiﬁ c experiment to investigate 
– or, some claimed, to demonstrate – the beneﬁ ts of policies to achieve more mixed 
communities.
The pilot was carried out in ﬁ ve cities: Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles and 
New York. For the purposes of implementation ‘neighbourhoods’ were deﬁ ned as 
census tracts, so on average they contained around 4,400 people. The issue of what 
constitutes a neighbourhood is obviously an open one (see, for example, Ellen and 
Turner, 2003; Durlauf, 2004; or Krupka, 2007) but census tracts, which are designed 
to be relatively homogeneous in terms of population characteristics, are widely used 
as approximations in empirical research in the USA.
To be eligible for the programme a family had to live in public or assisted housing in 
a ‘poor’ neighbourhood – one in which 40 per cent or more of residents were below 
the poverty line. They also had to have at least one child under 18, not be behind in 
rental payments, all family members had to be named on their current lease and no 
member of the family should have a criminal background. Thus, there were already 
two stages of selection before a family got on to the programme: (1) they had to want 
to move into a more afﬂ uent neighbourhood; and (2) they had to pass the eligibility 
criteria. This selection alone would be likely to have increased the chances of 
ﬁ nding positive effects of moving poor families to afﬂ uent neighbourhoods. The most 
problematic families were ineligible and, presumably, only those who thought they 
had a chance of beneﬁ ting from such a move volunteered. There were also other 
factors which arguably may have reduced the chances of ﬁ nding positive effects of 
the move: for example, a signiﬁ cant proportion of the children involved remained in 
the same school which had served their deprived neighbourhood.
Once in the programme families were randomly assigned to one of three groups. 
Group 1 – the experimental group – received a subsidy only spendable if they moved 
to a relatively afﬂ uent neighbourhood. An afﬂ uent neighbourhood was deﬁ ned as 
one in which 10 per cent or less of the residents lived below the poverty line. Such 
families received expert advice from housing professionals – or ‘counselling’ – to help 
them ﬁ nd suitable homes. Group 2 received a housing voucher/subsidy spendable in 
any location and no counselling. Group 3 – the control group – got no extra help but 
simply continued to live where they were (although of course free to move using their 
own resources).
10
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Across the ﬁ ve cities about a quarter of potentially eligible families applied for the 
programme with about 13 per cent of those applying being ruled out because they 
did not meet the conditions for selection. That still left some 4,600 families – enough 
for statistical analysis. The early evaluation of the programme, summarised in 
Goering and Feins (2003), was quite optimistic. Some of the successes reported 
were more or less deﬁ nitional – such as the fact that the characteristics of the 
neighbourhoods in which those in Group 1 (those assisted to move to more afﬂ uent 
neighbourhoods) lived at the end of three years were more afﬂ uent, with lower crime 
rates and better schools. There was also some evidence that successful movers had 
slightly different characteristics both from the residents of the poor neighbourhoods 
from which they were drawn (younger and poorer and more likely to be a female-
headed household) and from those assigned to Group 1 but who failed to move, 
usually because they could not ﬁ nd a house or ﬂ at to move to. Successful movers 
were more likely to be enrolled in adult education and drive a car; they tended also to 
have been more dissatisﬁ ed with their existing housing and neighbourhood. Wanting 
to escape from high neighbourhood crime rates was the most common reason for 
participation in the MTO project.
There were some positive ﬁ ndings, apparently supporting the underlying hypothesis 
that moving to a better neighbourhood would have a beneﬁ cial impact on individuals. 
There were differences across cities and some teams had earlier results than 
others but after two years there were indications of improvements in children’s 
behaviour, health and educational achievement, compared to the control group, 
although similar improvements were observed in Group 2 families who had been 
helped to move to neighbourhoods of their own choice – not necessarily more 
afﬂ uent ones. There were also differences between girls and boys, with behavioural 
improvements more marked in boys. There were, however, no differences in 
economic outcomes. Incomes and other labour market indicators for families moving 
to afﬂ uent neighbourhoods showed no improvement relative to other groups. But the 
programme was greeted as cautiously supporting the causal link between living in a 
deprived neighbourhood and negative impacts on an individual’s life chances:
… preliminary research on MTO families has demonstrated that 
beneﬁ cial, statistically signiﬁ cant changes have occurred in families’ lives 
within two to four years of their participation in MTO. 
(Goering et al., 2002)
But as they go on to note, the modest initial success of the programme did not 
mean that it was a policy success. The impacts were quite modest and costs were 
considerable. Counselling by housing experts alone cost $3,000 per family that 
successfully moved. But it did appear that the causal link had been demonstrated.
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Longer-term follow-up
More recent research (Kling and Liebman, 2004; Kling et al., 2005) on the MTO, 
tracking families over a longer period, destroys even this cautious optimism on the 
project: or at least suggests that causal processes are considerably more complex 
and outcomes of moving to an afﬂ uent neighbourhood more difﬁ cult to anticipate. 
Kling et al. (2005) report on a follow-up study, focusing on outcomes for young 
people aged 15 to 25, four to seven years after they moved. They pool all data for 
the ﬁ ve cities (whereas the earlier results were often based on analysis of data for 
only one city). For the 15–25-year-old group they have between 1,266 and 1,840 
individuals in each of the three treatment groups (those helped to move to an afﬂ uent 
neighbourhood, those helped to move to a neighbourhood of their choice and the 
control group not helped to move). Their study uses sophisticated statistical methods 
of analysis and focuses particularly on differences in crime and behaviour.
The earlier studies had shown no improvement in economic indicators for the 
group moving to more afﬂ uent neighbourhoods. Longer-term follow-up conﬁ rmed 
this ﬁ nding but the researchers looked at a wide range of indicators relating to 
educational achievement, health and welfare and also behaviour.2 They focused 
on the age group – 15 to 25 – in which it was most reasonable to look for signs of 
improvement. It is this age group which in the general population has the highest 
incidence of behavioural problems and within which educational progress might 
be most plausibly concentrated. So if moving to a more afﬂ uent neighbourhood 
produced any behavioural beneﬁ ts it should be easiest to ﬁ nd in this age group. 
For none of the indicators, however, did they ﬁ nd any signiﬁ cant overall differences 
between the groups that moved neighbourhoods compared to the control group that 
was not helped to move. For the age group as a whole some indicators were better 
and some were worse but, despite the large sample, none of these differences were 
statistically signiﬁ cant.
Subdividing into males and females did reveal some signiﬁ cant differences, however. 
Within the set of behavioural indicators were a number relating to criminality. Kling 
et al. (2005) extended the self-reported data set by also tracing administrative arrest 
records. This allowed a comparison of two independent sources of data. They found 
that while for violent crime there continued to be non-signiﬁ cant but – if anything 
– favourable effects for both the groups which moved, for property arrests there 
were signiﬁ cant differences for girls compared to boys. For both boys and girls in 
the ﬁ rst two years after moving, property arrests fell, although the reduction was 
not statistically signiﬁ cant, but for boys it then rose and rose signiﬁ cantly compared 
to the control group during the third and fourth year after moving. Overall – for both 
sexes combined over the whole four years – there was no signiﬁ cant reduction in 
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either arrests in total or in property arrests because the differences for boys and 
girls balanced out. For a small subsample which it was possible to track over a six-
year period, the increase in property crime arrests for boys continued at about the 
same level. Similar, but non-signiﬁ cant, gender differences are reported, in passing, 
for mental and physical health, education and substance use. Overall, males in the 
moving group had scores on the behavioural problem index some 20 per cent worse 
and arrest rates for property crime some 30 per cent higher than those of the control 
group of young males who did not move from their poor neighbourhoods.
They then sift the evidence for explanations of the difference in outcomes for 
boys compared to girls and the apparently initial favourable changes followed by 
signiﬁ cant negative effects for boys from two years after moving. Explanations 
might be peer group sorting – boys end up ﬁ nding similar peer groups in their new 
neighbourhoods to those they had in the previous ones; differences between boys 
and girls in coping strategies; and a comparative advantage for the boys in property 
offending. The reduction in girls’ arrest rates for property crime suggested that the 
increase in arrests for boys could not be explained by more efﬁ cient policing in the 
afﬂ uent neighbourhoods. Kling et al. (2005) judged peer group sorting effects as 
implausible as an explanation since similar patterns of change were evident for 
both boys and girls even when they were subdivided into those with a history of 
criminal or behavioural problems before the move. If peer group sorting was the 
explanation then one would expect those who had worse behaviour prior to moving 
would not have improved (if girls) or got worse (if boys) after the move. Differences 
in coping strategies in relation to the upset caused by moving to a different type of 
neighbourhood did not seem plausible as an explanation of their ﬁ ndings, they argue, 
because in the early period following the move both boys and girls showed similar 
reductions in arrests: it is only after two years, when presumably most young people 
would have got over the disruptive effects of the move, that boys’ arrest rates for 
property crime rise signiﬁ cantly.
Kling et al. (2005) come down in favour of what they call a ‘comparative advantage in 
property crime’3 explanation partly by elimination but also because of the evidence 
in relation to educational performance. Although the schools which young people 
went to after moving to more afﬂ uent neighbourhoods were better on academic 
performance indicators for the children attending them, it turned out that moving did 
not signiﬁ cantly improve the educational performance of the individual children. Thus, 
children who did not move ended up doing better in school relative to their peers 
than children who moved. The children who moved now had academically stronger 
peers against whom they were measured. Moreover moving boys did worse than 
girls relative to their new peer groups. They were less academically competitive than 
girls within their new schools. Boys were also less subject to parental supervision, 
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had more absences from school and lower educational ambitions than girls. The 
girls who moved had improved expectations for completing college compared to the 
control group, greater participation in sports, a reduction in school absences and 
an increased association with peers who engaged in school activities. None of this 
was true of the boys who moved. Thus, the authors conclude the most plausible 
explanation is that as boys adjusted to their more afﬂ uent neighbourhoods, they 
found they had a comparatively worse position in educational terms compared to 
their new peer group neighbours but an area in which they could succeed in their 
new neighbourhoods was in property crime.
The Moving to Opportunity experiment in the USA has been summarised at 
length because, given the manifold difﬁ culties, it is the best source of evidence for 
identifying the effect moving from a really deprived neighbourhood to a more afﬂ uent 
one has on those who make the move; it is equally the best source of evidence 
for identifying any beneﬁ cial effects of constructing mixed neighbourhoods. Other 
earlier studies and the initial evaluations of the MTO project are summarised in 
Durlauf (2004). Durlauf concludes that on the basis of studies then available, the 
balance of the empirical evidence did suggest there was a signiﬁ cant inﬂ uence of 
neighbourhood, although he was acutely aware of the difﬁ culties of identiﬁ cation.4 
This conclusion is overtaken by the longer-term follow-up studies of the MTO project. 
From these there seems to be no evidence of any improvement in the economic 
situation of adults who move, and outcomes for children who move are complex 
and causation is uncertain, even when there appear to be signiﬁ cant effects.5 On 
balance, there seem to be negative outcomes for boys on a range of indicators and 
positive outcomes for girls. One of the few indicators showing an improvement for 
both boys and girls is an important one – arrest rates for violent crime – but so far 
research does not show this to be statistically signiﬁ cant.
The evidence from other studies on neighbourhood 
effects
Similar experiments have not been tried in other countries. Short of an experimental 
control generated by randomly allocating families to one of three groups, long-term 
cohort studies offer the best solution to separately identifying the pure impact of 
neighbourhood on life chances. Two of the most convincing of these cohort studies, 
one in Canada and one in Britain, show a similar lack of signiﬁ cant long-term effect 
of neighbourhood on life outcomes or success. Oreopoulos (2003) used a Canadian 
sample survey which tracked individuals over 30 years. The simple relationship 
between neighbourhood of origin and subsequent earnings appeared to be 
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signiﬁ cant but, of course, families have a big inﬂ uence on the behaviour and choices 
of children. Once the earnings of siblings were added as an explanatory variable, 
the statistical inﬂ uence of neighbourhood entirely disappeared. The ﬁ nal conclusion 
was that the characteristics of the neighbourhood in which an individual was born or 
raised had no statistically signiﬁ cant effect on long-term labour market outcomes or 
on prosperity.
This ﬁ nding is consistent with the methodologically completely different study of 
Bolster et al. (2007). Using a British Household Panel Survey-derived cohort data 
set, following individuals for ten years, they ﬁ nd no evidence that original place of 
residence had any statistically signiﬁ cant inﬂ uence on subsequent labour market 
success, whether measured as household incomes or as earnings. Their results may 
be slightly less persuasive than those of Kling et al. or Oreopoulos since their data 
track individuals over only ten years and they investigate only economic outcomes. 
But they explore neighbourhood deﬁ nitions, concluding that a small unit, of only 
about 500 people, is the most appropriate measure of neighbourhood, and they 
use statistically sophisticated techniques. They cannot entirely reject the possibility 
that the original neighbourhood in which someone lived inﬂ uences their future 
prosperity but they ﬁ nd no statistical evidence that it does. Indeed, although not 
statistically signiﬁ cant, their result is in fact the unexpected one. After standardising 
for all the other factors which inﬂ uence incomes and earnings, coming from a poorer 
neighbourhood is associated with increased current prosperity! They conclude rather 
as Cheshire (1979):
[This] does not remove [the case for] an area basis for policy. The high 
levels of clustering may mean that the most efﬁ cient way of targeting 
individual policies is on an area basis. Nevertheless the results 
support the idea that the main sources of low incomes are to be found 
in earnings, employment and demographics, not in neighbourhood 
characteristics. 
(Bolster et al., 2007, p. 34)
Work for countries in continental Europe has not been able to apply such 
methodologically robust methods. There are no examples of either quasi-
experiments, such as the MTO project, or long-term cohort studies. Musterd (2006), 
however, does report work tracking individuals over time in the Netherlands and 
Sweden and relating changes in their prosperity to their individual characteristics 
and the characteristics of the neighbourhood in which they originally lived. These 
are for somewhat shorter periods than even the work of Bolster et al. (2007) and 
the controls and statistical methods used are perhaps somewhat more limited. 
In the Netherlands, Musterd (2006) reports only the weakest and non-signiﬁ cant 
15
Poverty and place: determining causation
of neighbourhood effects for the very poorest, although the impact of a ‘bad’ 
neighbourhood seemed to be slightly stronger for the next group up the ladder. 
Outcomes were measured as the probability of moving out of beneﬁ ts and into a paid 
job between 1989 and 1994. In the Swedish cities there seemed to be more evidence 
of neighbourhood effects during the 1990s, although these were still weak and high 
immigration rates in the early part of the period may have inﬂ uenced the results. In 
the Swedish work, neighbourhood effects were also measured in terms of probability 
of people of working age moving into work off beneﬁ ts, but over a longer period from 
1991 to 1999.
Specialised neighbourhoods as sources of welfare
As noted above, the tendency for people to sort into segregated or, in some 
sense, specialised neighbourhoods is a very strong one. Cities which are socially 
segregated along income lines are a universally established fact. Authors who have 
recently addressed such issues include Hårsman (2006), Meen (2006) and Musterd 
(2006). Meen’s work for Britain, already brieﬂ y summarised, shows beyond argument 
that not only is social segregation on income and other measures a feature of cities 
at least since the late nineteenth century, but the incidence of such segregation is 
very persistent over time. Many of the same cities with the sharpest incidence of 
spatially segregated neighbourhoods measured on 1971 data reappear in 2001 data. 
Many of the most deprived (and most afﬂ uent) neighbourhoods in London in 1881 
appear again in much the same positions in 2001.
Hårsman (2006) documents the stability of patterns of both income and ethnic 
segregation, particularly in Stockholm. In his detailed study of the long-term evolution 
of patterns of ethnic segregation, he shows how its incidence has tended to intensify 
over the last 20 years and is only partly explained by income differences. His 
evidence is at least consistent with people from ethnic minorities mainly choosing to 
live in ethnically specialised neighbourhoods, despite ofﬁ cial Swedish policy pushing 
for integration.
Musterd (2006) synthesises his work on three related areas: the (lack of) inﬂ uence 
of segregation on the overall economic prosperity of the wider urban area; the very 
distinct neighbourhood choices of skilled workers in different economic sectors 
in Amsterdam; and comparative work on the effects of neighbourhood mix on 
individual success in the Netherlands and Sweden summarised above. In particular, 
he shows that highly skilled workers in different service sectors choose different 
types of neighbourhood. Workers in ICT, ﬁ nancial services and banking choose 
16
Segregated neighbourhoods and mixed communities
to concentrate in the suburbs of Amsterdam while skilled workers in the creative 
industries are selectively concentrated in central neighbourhoods.
Labour market matching
These ﬁ ndings are entirely consistent with those of Bayer et al. (2005) for Boston. 
For a sample of 110,000 employed people, they match the precise location of 
residence and jobs and ﬁ nd a very strong tendency for people who live in the same 
neighbourhood (deﬁ ned as a census block) also to work in the same census block. 
They make an elaborate and convincing effort to eliminate the effects of transport 
networks and other factors which might explain this ﬁ nding independently of social 
interactions with neighbours – excluding non-family members. They ﬁ nd strong 
evidence showing that such interactions between neighbours strongly inﬂ uence 
the job locations of neighbours and that such interactions are more inﬂ uential if 
neighbours are of a similar level of education, are of similar age and both parties 
have children. Their conclusion is that social interactions within neighbourhoods 
between people similar to each other are a signiﬁ cant factor in how urban labour 
markets work and people ﬁ nd jobs.
Both conclusions are consistent with earlier US ﬁ ndings, such as those of Blau and 
Robins (1992), about the importance in job search of informal networks with friends 
and relatives. Blau and Robins found that while this was a frequent – but not the 
most frequent – method of job search, and particularly important for the less skilled, 
it was the most successful form of job search from the point of view of both workers 
and employers. It produced the highest rate of job offers per contact and the highest 
rate of job offer acceptances. In their recent review of the literature, Ioannides and 
Loury (2004) report that, in addition, such jobs found through personal contacts 
lasted longer, so that around half of all jobs were held by people who had found them 
this way. Ioannides and Loury also report a persistent increase in the use of informal 
contacts as a means of job search over time – despite the rise in the Internet – and 
that it is more prevalent the larger a city is: in cities of more than 500,000 more 
than half of unemployed job searchers relied on friends and acquaintances; in cities 
smaller than 100,000 less than 10 per cent did. Friends and acquaintances were a 
much more important source of jobs for those searching while unemployed than for 
those looking for new jobs while they were employed.
These last two observations are particularly important in the present context. They 
show an important source of positive effects of specialised neighbourhoods for lower-
skilled as well as for more skilled workers – unemployed job seekers are on average 
less skilled than employed job seekers but use friends and acquaintances more. The 
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fact that the use of friends and acquaintances increases with city size is consistent 
with the idea that specialised neighbourhoods represent a form of agglomeration 
economy. An advantage of larger cities is that they can support a greater range of 
specialised neighbourhoods and such neighbourhoods seem to be a fertile source of 
effective job matching.
Another less obvious example of the ways in which specialised neighbourhoods 
may increase productivity is provided by work on ethnic neighbourhoods. There are 
obvious consumption beneﬁ ts involved, as is brieﬂ y summarised below, but they 
may also yield income by helping people get information relevant to their jobs or ﬁ nd 
jobs. There have been numerous studies of the role ethnic neighbourhoods play in 
mediating access to jobs but a recent example in a European context is provided by 
the work of Coniglio (2004). He has a model in which minority non-local language 
speakers access labour markets via neighbourhood bilinguals who intermediate 
information within the wider labour market. Thus, for those who cannot speak the 
locally dominant language, living in ethnically segregated neighbourhoods generates 
higher productivity and incomes. He shows that such a model is consistent with the 
formation and stability of ethnic neighbourhoods in Norwegian cities.
Consumption and welfare beneﬁ ts
There seems to be quite persuasive evidence that specialised neighbourhoods 
have labour market advantages, even for the poor; indeed particularly for the less 
skilled who rely on personal contacts to a greater extent to ﬁ nd jobs. Even if there 
are some possible negative neighbourhood effects for poorer groups – and the 
more meticulously studies have been able to offset for other factors inﬂ uencing 
personal outcomes the less have they found any such effects – still the question 
also has to be asked: are there also consumption beneﬁ ts from living in specialised, 
and so segregated, neighbourhoods? People systematically tend to choose such 
neighbourhoods. That, itself, suggests there are beneﬁ ts.
Choice of neighbourhood is constrained by income, as are most economic choices, 
because houses in nicer neighbourhoods cost more (as is discussed in detail below) 
but people choose neighbourhoods on the basis of what a neighbourhood offers 
them which will either yield welfare directly or increase their expected incomes. 
And specialised neighbourhoods are better able to do both. There is also the issue 
addressed below that people’s welfare does not only depend on the level of their own 
income but on the level of their income relative to others living near them and with 
whom they associate. The strong ﬁ ndings on this, reported in Luttmer (2005), point 
to that being a very powerful reason for choosing to live in, and policy re-enforcing 
18
Segregated neighbourhoods and mixed communities
the existence of, neighbourhoods segregated by income. This is the very reverse of a 
policy of ‘mixed neighbourhoods’.
Specialised neighbourhoods provide direct consumption beneﬁ ts because they 
increase the range of choice for people with respect to the types of neighbourhood 
in which to live; and people and families of similar incomes, tastes or points in the 
life cycle tend to consume similar goods and services and require similar amenities. 
Living in a neighbourhood with a local Waitrose, Montessori school or gastropub 
commands a premium; neighbourhoods with pawnbrokers, a local Aldi and a 
takeaway are cheaper. If you are a recent immigrant and want to be able to continue 
to speak your original language, engage in your native culture or religion and buy 
food or other items you have developed a taste for, then there are great advantages 
in living in neighbourhoods with concentrations of people of similar origin. This is 
one obvious source of the ethnic neighbourhoods of large American and European 
cities. A recent study found linguistic communities in London (neighbourhoods) with 
children in primary schools speaking 300 different languages (Baker and Eversley, 
2000), living in linguistically and culturally specialised neighbourhoods.
But such agglomeration economies in consumption are not conﬁ ned to ethnic 
groups. Families with young children will ﬁ nd beneﬁ ts of networks and facilities, and 
mutual support as well as information, if they live in neighbourhoods with substantial 
numbers of families at the same stage in life. Young singles who eat out and have a 
taste for urban entertainment and culture will similarly ﬁ nd agglomeration economies 
in consumption if they ﬁ nd neighbourhoods in which large numbers of like-minded 
people are concentrated. More educated people, and people working in the liberal 
arts, may prefer to live in neighbourhoods with concentrations of similar types, 
sharing leisure and cultural pursuits and seeking similar local shops; business people 
may equally gain consumption beneﬁ ts from concentrating in neighbourhoods in 
which other business people live.
Ideas and insights about the contribution of specialised neighbourhoods to 
productivity go back a long way – for example to Marshall’s (1890) famous account 
of the ways in which industrial districts increase productivity and growth, because 
‘knowledge is in the air’. Luttmer’s (2005, p. 963) central idea that people’s welfare 
depends not just on their income but decreases as their own income falls relative to 
other people’s also has distant roots. He quotes Adam Smith (1759, p. 963):
Nothing is so mortifying as to be obliged to expose our distress to the 
view of the public, and to feel, that although our situation is open to the 
eyes of all mankind, no mortal conceives for us the half of what we suffer.
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He also quotes John Stuart Mill:
… men do not desire to be rich, but richer than other men
In attempting to test for the signiﬁ cance of this proposition and quantify its effects, 
there are a number of methodological problems – particularly the possibility that 
welfare is itself a relative concept. However, Luttmer (2005) goes to considerable 
lengths to eliminate possible biases from his estimates, including testing against 
absolute measures related to welfare, such as marital conﬂ icts, as well as against 
reported personal welfare itself. He analyses a sample of about 10,000 individuals 
from two phases6 of the National Survey of Families and Households living in a 
sample of 965 neighbourhoods – or 555 neighbourhoods for the subsample of 
neighbourhoods with respondents living in them at both time periods. His ﬁ ndings are 
striking. Roughly speaking losing £1,000 of income seems to make people feel about 
as much worse off as their neighbour gaining £1,000! The estimated impact of a 
positive change of household income on reported welfare is quantitatively almost the 
same as a similar, negative, change in neighbourhood mean incomes.
He subdivides the sample into households of single adults, couples living together 
at both sampling dates (stable couples) and adults living with different partners in 
the second time period. The strong negative impact of neighbours being richer on 
people’s sense of well-being estimated for the three groups together turns out to be 
explained mainly by the (large) subsample of stable couples in the data set. Single 
people do not seem to experience a loss of a sense of well-being from neighbours’ 
extra income. There is no statistically signiﬁ cant impact of neighbourhood income 
on measures of welfare for single people. Moreover, the effects are stronger for 
individuals who socialise with neighbours and the effect of neighbours’ incomes is 
stronger if the neighbour is more similar to you (only tested for those with and without 
a college education). If disaggregated measures of reported welfare are analysed 
then the main effects were in terms of time with family and hours worked. That is, it 
appears that people living in communities where neighbours have higher mean levels 
of income relative to their own compensate by working longer hours and spending 
less time with their families and in leisure. This causes them to feel themselves to be 
worse off and have lower reported welfare. The evidence points to a real impact of 
relative as well as own income on welfare.
Moreover, there is no signiﬁ cant effect of overall neighbourhood inequality. That 
implies it is not living in a less equal neighbourhood that lowers an individual’s 
welfare but speciﬁ cally having an income lower than the neighbourhood average. 
Perhaps the main problem with what is a very careful study is the deﬁ nition of 
‘neighbourhood’. For reasons of data availability these are the Public Use Microdata 
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Areas which, in the 1990 Census, had a mean population of 144,000 people. 
They are certainly considerably larger, therefore, than the usual concept of a 
neighbourhood. On the other hand, given that the ﬁ ndings capture a real effect of 
relative neighbourhood income which, on the basis of the accumulation of evidence 
Luttmer (2005) provides, seems plausible, then having data for smaller areas, 
corresponding more closely to conventional ideas of neighbourhoods, would seem 
likely to make the impact more signiﬁ cant still. The study ﬁ nds strong evidence 
that social interaction with neighbours is a causal factor and presumably social 
interactions per neighbour are considerably greater with your nearest 500 neighbours 
than they are with those living far away and not sharing the same schools, shops or 
parks. In a neighbourhood of 144,000 there will be few such opportunities to interact 
with most ‘neighbours’; in a smaller neighbourhood of 500 the chance of such 
interactions increases greatly. So the incomes of nearer neighbours are more likely to 
affect one’s sense of well-being than are those of more distant ones.
Luttmer’s results seem to imply that society as a whole would get considerably more 
welfare from a given total income if individuals and families did not have the higher 
incomes of neighbours confronting them on a permanent basis. This seems to apply 
to both poorer and richer groups. The poor would feel their absolute poverty less if 
they were not surrounded by richer households. If Luttmer’s results apply generally, 
therefore, the welfare of all would be improved if we had neighbourhoods more 
segregated on the basis of income rather than less segregated.
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3 The dynamics of neighbourhood 
segregation
There is little argument about the fact that people and households select themselves 
into neighbourhoods and that neighbourhoods tend to have a degree of homogeneity 
with respect to the characteristics of the people and families who live within them. 
Equally, the fact that cities have neighbourhoods segregated on the basis of income 
is uncontested. The issue is why rich and poor neighbourhoods emerge and, 
speciﬁ cally, whether living in a poor neighbourhood makes poor people or their 
children even worse off than they would otherwise have been. Associated with that 
question is whether, if living in a poor neighbourhood does make people even worse 
off than they would otherwise have been, the impact is sufﬁ cient that policy should 
speciﬁ cally address it.
It is perfectly possible that any neighbourhood effect – if it exists – is comparatively 
small and that the cost of policies to address it effectively is so great compared to 
the costs of other policies to improve the welfare of poor people that attempting to 
achieve ‘mixed neighbourhoods’ is simply not cost effective. It has already been 
noted that for the MTO project the average cost per head of just providing the expert 
personal advice needed to help poor people successfully ﬁ nd accommodation in an 
afﬂ uent neighbourhood was $3,000. Something the studies did not examine at all 
was what happened to the houses vacated by the participants who moved out of the 
poor neighbourhoods. Assuming they were in turn ﬁ lled by other poor people, then 
the total number of households still living in poor neighbourhoods was unchanged by 
the project: so presumably, therefore, were any costs associated with concentrations 
of poverty in neighbourhoods.
This brings us to the issue of neighbourhood dynamics. Too frequently, the 
assumption implicit in arguments for neighbourhood-based policies is that the 
inhabitants – the ‘local community’ – are a stable set of families. But this is not the 
case. Neighbourhoods are more like buses with a constantly changing set of people 
in them: people/families are always moving in and others moving out. This process 
is not random and may be signiﬁ cantly inﬂ uenced by neighbourhood-based policies 
themselves. The overall pattern of neighbourhoods is also related to the overall 
distribution of income within the urban housing market concerned: a case can be 
made, indeed, that neighbourhood segregation by income – remembering that many 
personal characteristics such as health, membership of disadvantaged groups, 
education and skills as well as criminality are strongly correlated with income – is 
effectively just the spatial articulation of the overall income distribution.
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If society’s income becomes more unequally distributed – the rich become richer 
relative to the poor – then residential segregation should be expected to become 
more sharply demarcated: ‘society’ again being composed of the set of households 
who occupy a given housing market area.1 The mechanism which produces this 
association between inequality and spatial segregation is the interactive sorting role 
of housing and labour markets. Both housing and labour markets are intrinsically 
‘spatial’. Houses and jobs are located precisely in space and the occupation of 
a particular house simultaneously determines a person’s access to their current 
job and other jobs and confers the ability to ‘consume’ a wide range of amenities, 
neighbourhood characteristics and local public goods.
Mobility – does getting on mean getting out?
First, let us look at some of the evidence of the determinants of mobility between 
neighbourhoods and why we should not expect policy interventions to be non-
random in their impact on the composition of a neighbourhood. An evaluation 
of a City Challenge programme of urban regeneration in Harlesden, in West 
London, suggested that training programmes had been well designed (after a 
false start) and well delivered.2 There had also been improvements in a range of 
neighbourhood qualities such as fear of crime. The City Challenge programme 
had lasted for ﬁ ve years and had injected substantial funds – £37.5 million – into 
a small neighbourhood. Despite the apparently successful training provided and 
the focus of the funding, unemployment among people living in the City Challenge 
neighbourhood at the end of the programme was higher relative to both West London 
as a whole and comparable disadvantaged neighbourhoods than it was at the start of 
the programme.
An obvious potential explanation was that people who had improved their labour 
market position as a result of the programme had differentially moved out of the 
neighbourhood. People had moved into the vacant housing to replace those moving 
out but those moving in had even more unfavourable labour market characteristics 
than the average for the community as a whole, and worse than those they replaced. 
To the extent the training programmes succeeded, they induced more churn. 
Paradoxically, therefore, the very success of the programme – if it had induced 
selective mobility – could have led to the deterioration in the unemployment rate of 
current residents noted at the end of the period.
To test this three samples were constructed of people of working age by comparing 
electoral registers for the start and end of the period: one sample was of people 
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moving out of the neighbourhood during the period of the programme (the 
‘Outmovers’); one of people resident within the neighbourhood throughout (the 
‘Stayers’); and a third of people moving into the neighbourhood over the ﬁ ve years of 
the programme (the ‘Inmovers’). All Outmovers who could be identiﬁ ed and tracked 
were surveyed. Samples of the other two groups were drawn randomly from the 
electoral register. Tracking Stayers and Inmovers was not difﬁ cult but tracking and 
interviewing Outmovers presented more problems. They were tracked by personally 
calling at their former addresses and asking for their current whereabouts and also 
by using electoral registers for the end period for all London boroughs and from 
those identifying electors who had previously been resident in the Harlesden City 
Challenge area. Former residents moving out of London altogether were not traced. 
This allowed us to track and interview a sample of 50 Outmovers but there was 
probably some selection bias with respect to those who were located and interviewed 
since successful returns from Outmovers not on the electoral register in their new 
destinations were particularly difﬁ cult. Two-thirds of the interviewed Outmovers were 
traced by comparing electoral registers.
The usefulness of the training schemes provided by the City Challenge programme 
was rated highly and this rating did not vary between groups. Attendance on the 
training schemes among the currently employed, however, had varied considerably 
across groups. The Stayers and the Inmovers displayed very low levels of 
participation (Stayers 13 per cent; Inmovers 6 per cent) whereas 37 per cent of the 
Outmovers had attended such courses. Perhaps reﬂ ecting this, the Outmovers, 
as Table 1 shows, had substantially improved their position in the labour market 
compared to ﬁ ve years previously on all dimensions and this improvement was 
statistically signiﬁ cant compared to either of the other groups.
The Outmovers were less likely to be unemployed than either other group (Table 2) 
– although this was only statistically signiﬁ cant when compared to the Inmovers. Not 
only that but, if employed, Outmovers were signiﬁ cantly more likely than either other 
group to have a full-time job. Of the currently employed in the Stayers group, 23 per 
cent had a part-time and 77 per cent a full-time job, whereas amongst the Inmovers 
only 13 per cent had a full-time job. Amongst employed Outmovers, in contrast, 97 
per cent were working full time.
Thus, this evidence on the relationship between mobility and labour market 
position points very strongly to the conclusion that if a person living in a deprived 
neighbourhood improves their employability and gets a job, they have a much 
increased probability of moving out to a better neighbourhood. It also, of course, 
demonstrates the irrelevance of judging the success of programmes designed 
to improve the employability and life chances of the residents of deprived 
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neighbourhoods by the unemployment rate of the residents of that neighbourhood at 
the end of the programme. The more successful the programme, the more mobility it 
is likely to induce regardless of where jobs are located since those who upgrade their 
skills and get (better) jobs – even if they get a job close to where they used to live 
– are more likely to move to a less deprived neighbourhood. Since Inmovers have 
much higher unemployment rates than other groups, the measured unemployment 
rate of current residents will rise. Compared to the MTO programme, which had no 
impact on the labour market position of adults moving to afﬂ uent neighbourhoods, 
it should, however, be noted that providing well-designed training for Harlesden 
City Challenge residents did improve their labour market positions; but those who 
beneﬁ ted disproportionately moved out.
Nicer neighbourhoods cost more
As Table 1 shows, improving one’s labour market position usually implies becoming 
richer. The Outmovers not only had relatively more skilled and more interesting 
jobs but their relative pay had increased compared to the other groups. As we learn 
more about how housing markets work, so we can understand better how they may 
interact with labour markets to sort households and individuals into more and less 
desirable neighbourhoods on the basis of their incomes. Cheshire and Sheppard 
(2004) take the case of good schools. Better schools (when access to a school is 
determined by geographical catchment areas) are an example of a whole class of 
‘goods’ one might call truly ‘positional’: that is, goods which can only be consumed 
by living in the appropriate place where they are available; and for which the ability 
Table 1  Mean rating of current job compared to job held ﬁ ve years previously*
 Sample size  Skill level
 (total number) of job Pay Conditions Satisfaction
Stayers 270 0.45 0.63 0.53 0.54
Inmovers 63 0.77 1.23 1.23 0.92
Outmovers 48 1.4 1.47 1.6 1.2
* Respondents rated the four attributes of their current jobs relative to the job they had held ﬁ ve years 
previously on a ﬁ ve-point scale ranging from −2 (much worse) to +2 (much better): so the larger the 
number the greater the improvement.
Table 2  Labour market position at time of survey
 Sample size  Inactive Currently unemployed Employed
 (total number)  (%)  (%)  (%)
Stayers 270 42 15 41
Inmovers 63 31 21 48
Outmovers 48 39 9 51
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to buy places giving access to them is chieﬂ y determined not by absolute income 
but income relative to others who are competing for the same ‘goods’. The most 
important and obvious of these in Britain is access to the best state schools. To the 
extent that a family’s address controls access to these, educational policy in Britain 
has created a situation in which it is not the most gifted or the most deserving who 
beneﬁ t from the best, supposedly free, state schools but those who can afford to buy 
access to them through the housing market.
There is now a wealth of evidence showing that housing is a complex good, 
composed of many attributes or characteristics, each of which commands a price. 
Since Rosen (1974), ‘hedonic’ analysis has become the standard framework within 
which these prices are analysed and estimated. ‘Hedonic’ is really just a way of 
thinking about the individual attributes of houses (that give pleasure and so cause 
people to be willing to pay for them) and then estimating the price of each. The price 
of any given house is then the sum of the prices being paid for all its individual and 
particular attributes. Although the idea is simple, it has proved fruitful as a way of 
analysing housing markets. Hedonic studies of housing markets have mushroomed 
and it seems to be an area in which genuine progress of a scientiﬁ c kind has been 
made. Studies have incrementally improved the methodology and reﬁ ned the 
estimation process.
Evidence that people buy local public goods through their choices in the housing 
market goes back at least to Oates (1969) and estimates of the price paid for school 
quality have improved over time. Recent studies in the USA have included Haurin 
and Brasington (1996) and Black (1999). One of the ﬁ rst studies in the UK was 
Cheshire and Sheppard (1995) but more recent estimates by the same authors 
(Cheshire and Sheppard, 2004) reveal much more about the process. Indeed, it 
has become increasingly clear how complicated housing markets are and how 
sophisticated are the ways in which housing attributes – and so ultimately housing 
itself – are priced.
What people appear to buy as they engage in house hunting is not the current set 
of attributes but something corresponding to the expected long-run set of attributes. 
Cheshire and Sheppard (2004) found that it was not just the current quality of 
primary schools, as reﬂ ected in their most recent Key Stage 2 results, which 
determined the price paid for access to ‘primary school quality’. The price paid also 
incorporated a discount for current school quality if there was more variation in the 
performance of the school over the past ﬁ ve years and if the house was located in 
an area in which new construction was concentrated. More consistent performance 
measurably increased a house buyer’s conﬁ dence that a similar quality would be 
maintained in the future. Interestingly the effect of more new construction in the local 
26
Segregated neighbourhoods and mixed communities
area in depressing house prices was speciﬁ cally related to school quality. There 
was no signiﬁ cant evidence of just a general ‘area of new construction’ effect. It was 
only when local new construction was expressed as a discounting factor on local 
school quality that a statistically signiﬁ cant effect on house prices was found. More 
local construction increased the likelihood that an address could be reassigned to 
another school as the local education authority implemented its explicit policy of 
ﬁ lling its available school capacity. It may also have increased uncertainty about 
the composition of the intake to the local school in the future as new households 
moved into the neighbourhood. So both more variation in performance in the past 
and more local new construction reduced the price buyers would pay for the current 
performance of the school a house gave access to.
Moreover, studies are ﬁ nding increasingly complex interactions with other variables. 
For example, the price paid through the housing market for access to parks or open 
space of a given character appears to vary with the density of the neighbourhood, 
household incomes and local crime levels (Anderson and West, 2006); the price 
paid for proximity to open countryside varies with the likelihood of its remaining 
undeveloped (Irwin, 2002). In the context of school quality, Cheshire and Sheppard 
(2004) found that the price paid for a given quality of local school – measured in 
terms of results in public examinations achieved by pupils – varied with the suitability 
of the house to accommodate children. These are not surprising ﬁ ndings but data 
and estimation methods make it increasingly possible to estimate them and make 
those estimates increasingly accurate.
What hedonic studies of housing markets show is that access to higher-amenity 
open space, natural amenities like views or proximity to water, greater security from 
crime or better-quality state-provided education costs a substantial amount. The 
value of all such amenities and local public goods is capitalised into house prices. 
As an example, moving an otherwise average house from the catchment area of the 
worst to that of the best primary school in Reading in 1999/2000 was associated with 
an increase of one third in its price.3 Figure 1 shows how the price of an otherwise 
average house in Reading changed as the quality of its local primary and secondary 
schools varied.
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Thus, the ability to beneﬁ t from or consume such localised goods is dependent on 
the ability of a household to buy a house in those particular neighbourhoods which 
give access to them. Since the supply of such goods is relatively inelastic and varies 
signiﬁ cantly from neighbourhood to neighbourhood – like many local public goods 
and other amenities they are only available at speciﬁ c locations – and demand 
increases more than proportionately as incomes rise, the price rises sharply with 
increasing quality and rising income. But their more or less ﬁ xed supply also means 
that the ability to buy such goods is more determined by how rich a household is 
relative to other households competing for the same local amenities than it is by the 
household’s absolute income: that is, by where a household is in the distribution of 
incomes in the housing market area concerned.
More fundamental aspects of how people live and how real welfare is distributed 
appear to follow from this observation. As was discussed in Brueckner et al. (1999), 
cities have a natural geographically and topographically determined endowment of 
Figure 1  Price of school quality in the Reading housing market, 1999/2000 (house 
price in £000s as quality of local schools varied over observed range*)
* Secondary school quality measured as proportion of pupils obtaining ﬁ ve or more GCSEs at grade 
C or better; primary school quality measured as school’s mean scores on the three Key Stage 2 
subjects aggregated. Percentage scores represented as proportions.
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some amenities – where the best views are to be had, where the natural amenities 
such as river frontage are available or where, as determined by prevailing winds, air 
quality is better. In the context of most Old World cities, of course, there was also a 
ﬁ xed neighbourhood within which a particularly valuable local public good – security 
– was available: within the city walls. These locationally ﬁ xed amenities or public 
goods generated clustering of those households who had a taste for and could 
afford them. In turn, this generated higher local incomes, supporting better local 
cultural and commercial amenities and classier neighbourhoods with better schools 
and lower crime rates. This further reinforced the attractions of the more attractive 
neighbourhoods.
While it is common to think of the prices of composite goods, such as housing, being 
the sum of a set of prices for the individual attributes of which they are made up, it 
is less common to consider a market for each relevant attribute with its own demand 
and supply characteristics. Yet, that is clearly important and the supply characteristics 
of individual housing attributes will vary signiﬁ cantly. Some, such as central heating 
or the number of rooms in a given space, can easily be reproduced industrially and 
so will be elastic in supply. Others would, in the absence of regulation, normally 
be elastic in supply. More urban space in aggregate (except in exceptional places 
such as Singapore) can always be made available by the construction of additional 
transport infrastructure. But in Britain, and increasingly in other countries, the supply 
of urban space is constrained by land use regulations such as density controls, 
urban containment, local zoning or protective designation. Other attributes, such as 
access to particular natural amenities, open spaces or the ‘best’ local, state-funded 
school, may be intrinsically in very inelastic supply. As noted above, the demand for 
most characteristics – including housing space, classier neighbourhoods and local 
amenities – increases disproportionately with income: it is what economists call 
‘income elastic’. Estimates in Cheshire and Sheppard (1998) were that for many of 
this type of attribute, an increase in household income of 10 per cent was associated 
with an increase of 15 to 20 per cent in the amount spent on them.
It would appear to follow from this that competition for access to better-quality, 
locationally ﬁ xed ‘goods’ will price poorer households out of access to – or at least 
force them to consume lower-quality – local public goods and amenities, and so 
generate systematic patterns of residential segregation between richer and poorer 
neighbourhoods. Given that poverty is correlated with other characteristics such as 
lower educational attainment, poorer health, higher unemployment and membership 
of disadvantaged groups, it would seem plausible that residential segregation is 
the spatial articulation of income inequality in society. Residential segregation 
contributes to lower welfare for poorer groups since households derive signiﬁ cant 
welfare from access to the better-quality local public goods, including better security, 
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and amenities. But really this is just another manifestation of the price mechanism 
interacting with the distribution of income to allocate goods according to ability to pay 
and preferences. Indeed, it may be an important part of the explanation why access 
to public services provided out of taxation is closely correlated with the distribution 
of income (Goodin and Le Grand, 1987). Although they appear to be distributed 
according to need, in many cases you have to ‘buy’ access to them through the 
housing market.
A further implication is that if the distribution of household incomes changes, this 
will be reﬂ ected in the intensity of residential segregation. If, for example, incomes 
become more unequally distributed – as happened in the UK, the USA and several 
other OECD countries from the mid 1970s to the mid 1990s – under certain 
circumstances described below, there should be an intensiﬁ cation of residential 
segregation with poorer households losing welfare not just because of lower incomes 
but also from greater exclusion from high-quality local public goods.4 The increase 
in residential segregation has certainly been documented in the US context and 
discussed by Massey and Fischer (2003). They show that inequality across regions 
has decreased while at the same time between neighbourhoods in US urban areas it 
has increased.
This pattern is to be expected if the supply of at least some of these localised goods 
is inelastic (the ‘best’ local state school or a house overlooking Hampstead Heath 
or the Thames, for example) while the demand is income elastic. If these conditions 
hold then their relative price should be expected to increase if the rich get richer 
relative to the poor. More expensive houses in more expensive neighbourhoods 
will become relatively more expensive still, pricing the poor out to less desirable 
neighbourhoods even more completely. For example, if only 0.05 per cent of houses 
in London can overlook a feature as attractive as Hampstead Heath then your ability 
to ‘buy’ that feature does not depend so much on your absolute income as on your 
income relative to the incomes of other households who have a taste for overlooking 
Hampstead Heath.
Analysis of the structure of house prices as the quantities of attributes increase 
produces results that are consistent with this perspective. Figure 1 shows this for 
the price of an otherwise average house. Its price increases very little if the local 
school goes from being the worst to middling but if you live in the catchment area 
of a quite good school – where, say, pupils average 75 per cent on their Key Stage 
2 tests (so on the scale used in Figure 1, the school has a ‘quality score’ of 2.25) 
– obtaining access to the best primary school costs a great deal. Say there were 100 
primary schools in the Reading area and using the values estimated in Cheshire 
and Sheppard (2004), then moving an otherwise average house from the catchment 
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area of the worst to that of the tenth worst made no discernible difference to its price; 
moving it from that of the tenth worst to the tenth best increased the price by 10.4 per 
cent; but moving it from the catchment area of the tenth best primary school to that 
of the best of all would have been associated with an additional 16.9 per cent in its 
price.
Apart from access to the Thames, where all the price increase was associated with 
having frontage to the river itself, other attributes for which the premium paid for the 
‘best’ observed was particularly large were closeness to the town centre and space – 
both inside houses and garden space. Equally, there were some attributes for which 
the estimates showed that most – or a substantial proportion – of the price variation 
was associated with going from having the very ‘worst’ observed to something just 
a little better: deprivation (measured as the index of employment deprivation5) was 
such an attribute. Again if there were 100 wards and one could move an otherwise 
average house from one to another, going from the most deprived to the tenth 
most deprived increased the price proportionately more than going from the tenth 
most afﬂ uent to the most afﬂ uent. Elaborate precautions were taken in the study to 
standardise for all signiﬁ cant factors affecting local house prices including, of course, 
the social and economic composition of the neighbourhood.
These results are likely to reﬂ ect the pattern of preferences but they are also 
consistent with the interpretation offered above. Attributes of houses, or amenities to 
which particular houses give privileged access, which are in ﬁ xed or limited supply 
take on the status of truly ‘positional goods’ that are auctioned off via the market 
for houses to the highest bidders. The ability to buy is determined not by absolute 
income but by income relative to other households competing for the same goods. 
That school quality and private land and space consumption should exhibit this 
behaviour is consistent with the argument presented above. Local governments 
act to constrain the supply of land for housing and – no doubt unintentionally – the 
availability of the highest-quality public goods.6 An additional source of supply 
limitation may arise from ‘peer group effects’ and the preference of households to 
live in areas in which they ﬁ nd their neighbours desirable or compatible. If richer 
and better-educated neighbours, who spend more on their children’s education, are 
perceived as desirable, then the neighbourhoods in which they are concentrated 
are by deﬁ nition limited in supply and hence local neighbourhood quality becomes 
a positional good. In this way many of the ‘non-market’ interactions that are an 
essential component of cities (as persuasively argued by Glaeser, 2001) are actually 
brought into a form of market allocation via the housing market.
The house and neighbourhood characteristics allocated in the housing market 
include not only the public goods themselves, but also risk and uncertainty 
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concerning their levels. As noted above, the measure of the past variation in the 
quality of a local school was also reﬂ ected in the price paid for a given current level 
of measured quality. Gibbons (2004) showed that neighbourhood crime – an indicator 
of real risk – was similarly reﬂ ected in house prices in London.
The actual price paid for any attribute will depend on the characteristics of the local 
housing market7 and economy since both these inﬂ uence the supply and demand 
characteristics of individual attributes. For a given measure of income inequality 
the best local school will cost substantially less in housing markets where average 
incomes are low than they will in high-income housing markets because demand is 
income elastic. In the higher-income housing market people will be spending a higher 
proportion of their incomes trying to buy educational quality. If incomes become 
more unequal over time (or in housing markets in which incomes are more unequally 
distributed) then the price of attributes in ﬁ xed supply will rise and we should expect 
an even stricter sorting of households between nicer and more disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods. The best state schools become even more strictly reserved for the 
richest local households (ignoring private education, access to which is explicitly 
determined by income, not place of residence).
Thus, house prices are about much more fundamental economic and social issues 
than dinner party conversations or estate agents’ talk would credit. The way in which 
the housing market works explains an important part of the underlying differences 
in real welfare in society both vertically between households and across space: that 
is, the patterns of spatial segregation one observes in all cities. Many local public 
goods, funded from taxation and which we think of as naturally being provided on an 
equal basis to all households, are really much better thought of as being allocated 
through the housing market. Consumption of them is thus conditioned on household 
income in just the same way as consumption of foreign holidays, private education, 
personal security services or broadband Internet access is conditioned on income. 
But because the supply of many of them is more or less ﬁ xed within a particular 
urban area or housing market, income relative to others competing for access to the 
same goods is the real determinant rather than the absolute level of income itself.
Pricing the poor out of better neighbourhoods
This brings us on to a ﬁ nal issue. If the preceding account is correct and income 
inequality leads to residential segregation, then changes in the distribution of income 
should lead to changes in the distribution of house prices that reﬂ ect this. If the rich 
become richer relative to the poor and so are more effectively able to outbid the poor 
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to gain access to valued localised amenities and public goods, the supply of which is 
inelastic, then expensive houses should become relatively more expensive compared 
to cheap ones.
Data against which to test this are difﬁ cult to obtain. Ideally a series of samples of 
house prices for a given housing market over time and matching data on incomes for 
households within that same housing market are required. Such data – at least for 
UK housing markets – are not easily obtained but work done on the Reading housing 
market (reported in Cheshire and Sheppard [various] and Cheshire et al., 1999) does 
provide such data for two different dates at least – 1984 and 1993.8 The discussion 
below relates strictly to these two survey-based data sets except where noted.
There was a signiﬁ cant widening of income differentials in England and Wales as 
a whole between 1984 and 1994. For example, the New Earnings Survey (NES) 
shows the ratio of the gross earnings of a person at the 90th percentile point in the 
distribution, relative to the mean as 1.54 in 1984 compared to 1.61 in 1994. The 
same source shows earnings becoming signiﬁ cantly more unequal in Berkshire, 
with the same ratio widening from 1.55 to 1.70. The NES, however, is not really a 
satisfactory source for investigating the overall distribution of household incomes 
since very high earners are excluded from the survey and it relates just to the 
earnings of individuals. The sample data for the Reading area have the great 
advantage of being precisely related to houses and the prices of those houses 
but they also have some disadvantages. They relate to the joint gross incomes of 
households but only to those owner-occupiers in the sample from whom a survey 
was returned. Given that the survey was of occupiers of sampled houses for sale or 
recently sold, a signiﬁ cant proportion of which were vacant at the time of survey, the 
overall response rate of around 47 per cent for each survey round was respectable. 
Thus, it differs from the NES in that it excludes incomes of renters who have lower 
incomes on average than owner-occupiers, but for couples both incomes from 
all sources will be included in the reported household gross income, as will the 
incomes of the highest earners. Thus, we should expect the survey distribution to be 
substantially more unequal, however equality is represented, than would be the case 
of the NES.9
Since incomes were reported by quite large bands (over 20 per cent of respondents 
in both surveys were in the highest income band), representing the degree of 
equality or inequality by the ratio of the 90th percentile point to the mean is rather 
crude, but for direct comparison with the NES this ratio moved from 1.61 to 1.97 
between 1984 and 1993 – a substantially greater measured increase in income 
inequality. The Gini coefﬁ cient is a more subtle measure of the equality or inequality 
of a distribution. It is expressed as a ratio and so can range in value from 0 to 1. If 
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all households had the same income – which one could take as a state of ‘perfect 
equality’ – the value of the Gini coefﬁ cient would be 0; if only one household had 
had all the income in Reading then that would be the extreme of inequality and the 
value of the Gini coefﬁ cient would have been 1. If incomes for each household are 
interpolated using a standard procedure10 then one can estimate a Gini coefﬁ cient for 
the distribution at each date. The value of that was 0.35 in 1984 but 0.53 in 1993: an 
indication of a very substantial increase in income inequality.
Turning to the distribution of house prices, there is a parallel but smaller increase 
in distributional inequality measured by the Gini coefﬁ cient: this moved from 0.22 
to 0.28 between the two survey dates. Examining the (in)equality of the distribution 
of house prices (by comparing the ratio of the 90th percentile point to the mean) 
also shows an increase in house price inequality, with the more expensive houses 
becoming relatively even more expensive between the two periods. The ratio 
increased from 1.46 to 1.66 between 1984 and 1993.
This is far from conclusive evidence in support of the argument above since it is just 
two observations. Nothing of statistical signiﬁ cance can, therefore, be read into it. 
Moreover, conceptually one could argue that changes in the post-tax distribution of 
incomes would be more relevant than gross incomes. Arguably, some measure of 
the quality of houses should also be included. Rising prices compared with incomes 
and the increase in the real price of land for housing reﬂ ecting the planning policies 
of constraining urban expansion, coupled with rising demand for housing space 
(see Cheshire and Sheppard, 2005), produced signiﬁ cant pressures for subdivision 
of existing stock and building ﬂ ats rather than houses in the Reading market. 
Thus, the change in the distribution of all house prices may be a less than perfect 
representation of any change in the price distribution of ‘quality constant’ houses 
over the same period. Nevertheless, what can be concluded is that what evidence 
is available is consistent with the hypothesis that an increase in income inequality 
leads to a parallel increase in house price inequality as the relatively richer compete 
more successfully for access to the limited supply of the ‘best’ houses in the ‘best’ 
neighbourhoods.
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This report does not argue that ‘neighbourhood effects’ do not exist. While the 
evidence is overwhelming that poor people are priced into deprived neighbourhoods 
because they are poor, living in the most deprived neighbourhoods is almost by 
deﬁ nition not a life-enhancing experience. Because of peer group and role model 
effects, coupled simply with increased threats to health – even life1 – from accidents 
and crime, the experience may impair the life chances of those who live in them and 
especially those of children raised in them. Before engaging in signiﬁ cant efforts and 
spending substantial resources to use policy to force neighbourhoods to be mixed, 
however, it seems essential to have a clear idea of how large such neighbourhood 
effects are and what beneﬁ ts specialised, homogeneous neighbourhoods may confer 
on both richer and poorer households.
The evidence presented here suggests that the beneﬁ ts of specialised 
neighbourhoods are signiﬁ cant in terms of both ﬁ nding suitable jobs and increasing 
the range of choices available to people and the welfare they derive from living 
in cities. Despite major research efforts and expenditure – for example the US 
experiment of the Moving to Opportunity programme – evidence of any signiﬁ cant 
additional negative effects of living in deprived neighbourhoods (compared to the 
fact of poverty and the features which tend to make someone poor in the ﬁ rst place) 
is very elusive. So while there may be beneﬁ ts from mixing communities, there are 
almost certainly costs too, and to judge the policy, the net gains, including the costs, 
need consideration. The costs are likely to reﬂ ect the processes which underlie the 
persistence of neighbourhoods segregated along income lines because these would 
have to be reﬂ ected in the scale of resources needed to achieve neighbourhoods 
that are more mixed as a lasting element in our cities.
The evidence reviewed here, particularly the most recent ﬁ ndings from cohort studies 
and the US Moving to Opportunity project, does not support the conclusion that 
neighbourhood effects are quantitatively all that important nor that moving the poor 
to afﬂ uent neighbourhoods improves their welfare overall. However, we do know that 
the rich can always outbid the poor for nicer neighbourhoods because the desirable 
attributes of these neighbourhoods are fully reﬂ ected in the prices of houses within 
them. To the extent that this is true, social segregation in cities must largely reﬂ ect 
economic inequality rather than cause it. Forcing neighbourhoods to be mixed in 
social and economic terms is, therefore, mainly treating the symptoms of inequality, 
not the causes.
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At the same time there seem to be direct welfare beneﬁ ts from living in specialised 
neighbourhoods with other complementary and similar households, and probably 
output beneﬁ ts, too, because of better labour market networking and matching. To 
the extent that these are signiﬁ cant, the policy directly destroys a potential source of 
welfare and a portion of the consumption and productivity beneﬁ ts cities are capable 
of delivering. To the extent that Luttmer’s (2005) ﬁ ndings generally apply and welfare 
falls as a person’s income falls relative to their neighbours’, then that is an additional 
reason why mixed neighbourhoods may reduce welfare. All these possible losses 
need to be balanced against any beneﬁ ts of reduced negative ‘neighbourhood 
effects’.
Among the many things poor people buy less of are the amenities available from 
living in afﬂ uent neighbourhoods. Their poverty constrains them to consume less of 
everything. Food stamps may be paternalistic but at least we know that poor people 
beneﬁ t from eating better (and having some extra income left over to spend on other 
things). The problem is that there is scant evidence that the poor get any net beneﬁ ts 
from being forced to live in more afﬂ uent neighbourhoods. They will have better local 
amenities than they could otherwise afford but if they have any choice in where they 
currently live, the evidence of their location shows they value other things more. 
They lose the support of other families like themselves and local services tailored 
to the needs of poorer people rather than the rich. Having a sympathetic small shop 
within walking distance which, though it may have high prices, stocks what you want 
and may give a bit of credit when you are most hard pressed is a lot more useful to 
a struggling single parent than being a short drive from a supermarket catering for 
afﬂ uent professionals.
That the disadvantaged are concentrated in poor neighbourhoods does not 
demonstrate that poor neighbourhoods are a cause of disadvantage. If that is the 
case, the conclusion for policy is to reduce income inequality in society, not build 
‘mixed neighbourhoods’ or improve the built environment in such neighbourhoods. 
Mixed neighbourhood policies may divert attention from the need for effective income 
redistribution. Policies should help people and people who are effectively helped 
have an increased probability of moving away from the poor neighbourhoods in 
which they currently live. This, in turn, is likely to make the indicators for those poor 
neighbourhoods worse rather than better: but that does not mean that the policy was 
not a success.
The obverse of this is that if policies do not effectively address the underlying 
causes of poverty, improving the physical environment and amenities of deprived 
neighbourhoods may simply displace poorer people to even less attractive 
neighbourhoods, so the poorest have to bear disruption costs as well as poverty 
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while continuing to live in a low-quality built environment. These arguments do not, 
of course, imply that it is never useful to deliver policies aimed at reducing societal 
inequality in poor neighbourhoods (e.g. improving labour force skills). It is in the 
poorest neighbourhoods that those who most need the help of people-targeted 
policies tend to be concentrated.
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Chapter 2
1 Housing and Community Development Act 1992.
2 Kling et al. (2005) report brieﬂ y on such factors as getting into ﬁ ghts, getting 
along with teachers, perceptions that school discipline was ‘fair’, having ﬁ ve 
or more friends and reported feelings of worthlessness, ﬁ nding no signiﬁ cant 
differences on any measure. A wide range of educational, mental and physical 
health and behavioural indicators were examined in Kling and Liebman (2004). In 
general they reported some signiﬁ cant beneﬁ cial changes for girls but negative 
and mainly not signiﬁ cant effects for young males.
3 By this they meant that the boys were doing not only absolutely worse in 
education and other realms than their new, afﬂ uent peer group but relatively 
worse in such terms than they would have done in their old, deprived 
neighbourhoods compared to the peers they would have had there; they do 
not say – but perhaps they also imply – that they also had relatively more 
opportunities for property crime in their new, afﬂ uent neighbourhoods.
4 He compared results of 25 studies published between 1982 and 2003. Outcome 
measures ranged from marriage rates and teenage pregnancies through 
school drop-out rates to standard labour market measures, such as wages or 
unemployment. All studies surveyed were econometric in nature and while some 
found no evidence of neighbourhood effects, the majority did conclude there was 
an impact of neighbourhood on outcomes for individuals. However, as Durlauf 
notes, methodological problems are severe and such evidence was unlikely to 
convince those who were sceptical. He wrote before the methodologically most 
convincing studies, those of Oreopoulos (2003) and Kling et al. (2005), were 
available.
5 Apart from the increase in boys’ arrests for property crime in the longer term, the 
cause of some of the improvements in health measures are unclear. For example, 
Katz et al. (2001) note that the signiﬁ cant improvement in childhood asthma 
reported for both families moving to more afﬂ uent neighbourhoods and those 
moving to locations of their own choice could be due to characteristics of the 
structures and particularly the absence of rats – a common asthma trigger – in 
the new homes and locations, not to classic neighbourhood effects. If reduction in 
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exposure to rats were the cause, then getting rid of rats would seem to be a very 
much more cost-effective policy to achieve the health improvement than mixed 
communities.
6 1987–88 and 1992–94.
Chapter 3
1 We can adapt DiPasquale and Wheaton’s (1996, p. 24) deﬁ nition of a 
geographical real estate market: a geographic/spatial housing market is the area 
which ‘encompasses all housing units that are inﬂ uenced by the same economic 
conditions’.
2 This section draws on Cheshire et al., 1998.
3 In the models discussed here all prices are estimated to vary not just as the 
quantity of the attribute in question changes (for example, the ﬁ rst bathroom is 
worth a lot more than the ﬁ fth) but as the quantity of other attributes varies (for 
example, the price paid for more space inside a house of given size also varies 
with the size of the garden, or the value paid for primary school quality varies with 
the suitability of the house to accommodate children). As a result, this calculation 
of the impact on price of moving a house from the worst to best primary school 
catchment area can only be done by assuming some particular levels for all other 
attributes. Here it is assumed that all other attribute levels are equal to the sample 
mean, the sample being the random sample of houses sold in the local housing 
market in 1999/2000 which was used to estimate the model.
4 And, of course, if the poorer household themselves own property in the poor 
neighbourhoods, they will also lose from lower relative asset values – see below.
5 The DETR index of neighbourhood employment rather than multiple deprivation 
was used in order to avoid any possible deﬁ nitional correlation. A minor element 
in the Index of Multiple Deprivation is the performance of the local primary school 
on Key Stage 2.
6 That is not because they usually want there to be worse schools or public parks 
but because there can only be one ‘best’ school or park. This is not the case 
with land supply which is intentionally restricted in order to implement urban 
containment policies.
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7 Including, of course, local policy. If access to schools is not determined by 
place of residence but by some other mechanism, for example by lot or by 
selective examination, then there would be no price paid via the housing market. 
Consistent with this and demand for school quality being income elastic is 
the estimated hedonic price of school quality in the Reading compared to the 
Darlington housing markets in 1993 and 1997 respectively. Again looking at 
the ‘average’ house, the price per GCSE point improvement in Reading, where 
mean sampled incomes were £28,610 per annum, was £243.9 while in 1997, in 
Darlington, where mean incomes were £23,422, it was £30.8. However, since not 
only were incomes lower in Darlington but allocation to schools was less tightly 
tied to home address, we cannot be sure what the contribution of each factor 
separately was to the difference in the price of ‘school quality’ for the mean home.
8 The data set for 1999/2000 did not contain household income.
9 The NES excludes all the highest earners but they are included in the survey. 
Renters have lower incomes on average than owner-occupiers but the variance 
of incomes in the lower tail of the overall distribution is less than in the upper tail. 
While the survey undersamples low-income households because it omits renters, 
it still includes some low-income households, such as owner-occupied pensioner 
households.
10 Each income band in the survey is represented by a point interpolated applying a 
Pareto distribution to the overall data and each household in each income band is 
assigned the income at that point.
Chapter 4
1 Studies estimating neighbourhood effects by tracking cohorts of individuals over 
time, such as Oreopoulos (2003) or Bolster et al. (2007), since they only track 
survivors, may underestimate neighbourhood effects if being raised in the most 
deprived neighbourhoods increases death rates for young people.
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